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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to explain why rural policy based upon market economics 
cannot deliver appropriate rural policies to Australia in the 21st century. It 
also discusses why environmental policy and rural policy are on a collision 
course.  Regions lie unappreciated in the middle. 
 
Three key themes are developed: 
• Rural policy is still entrenched in the policy debate of the third 
quarter of last century and cannot meet the policy needs of a rural 
sector in the twenty first century. 
•  Environmental, conservation and resource depletion impacts of the 
production process are excluded from input pricing constructs of 
CGE modelling and of policy so informed. 
• In 1995 ratification by member countries of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture moved international trade in agriculture to a rules 
based system. Australia remains clinging to the Cairns Group 
agenda from the 1980s. 
 
For Australian regions the impacts have been varied but are often manifestly 
severe as can be seen from available statistics.  If Australian regions are to 
develop to their due potential the roles of agriculture in regional development 
needs to be comprehensively and critically understood.  Historically many 
Australian regions have advanced using agriculture and, we are told, this 
may occur again.  Turning what are presently little more than pious hopes 
into successful regional realities requires considered, consistent policy and 
appropriately coordinated actions. 
 
 
1. Agriculture and policy in context 
 
As Australian agriculture enters the twenty first century, most major export 
orientated rural industries have experienced dislocation in one form or another. A 
complex mixture of events has led Australian agriculture to where it is today.  
Internationally, there was an international commodity price collapse over the late 
1980’s and into the 1990’s.  Rigid Soviet and Sino Communism disintegrated, with 
markedly varied results and implications for Australian exports.   Domestically 
compounding the protracted drought across a large part of eastern Australia were a 
series of policy repositionings.  These followed on from events of the early 1970s. 
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Changed emphasis in Australia saw new philosophy, policies, priorities and 
preferences.  These included: 
• Change in the underlying economic philosophy and direction of agricultural 
policy from a Keynesian interventionist approach to a market determined 
philosophy based upon general equilibrium theory.  This is commonly termed 
economic rationalism.   
• Introduction of National Competition Policy (NCP) in 1995 extended the 
Competitive Conduct Rules of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act to orderly 
marketing of agricultural production (Australia. Productivity Commission. 
1999, p72).  All State Governments undertook to review all legislation that 
restricted competition by the year 2000. Deregulation of regulated industries 
followed with marked and sometimes disastrous effects upon industries and 
communities 
• The 1995 ratification of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture established a 
system of managed international trade for agriculture rendering irrelevant 
Australia’s domestic policy direction based upon a free trade agenda. 
• An increasing awareness of issues associated with urban lifestyle concerns 
over conservation and environmental issues such as sustainable agriculture 
have brought free market rural policy and environmental policy into open 
conflict. 
Those in Agriculture were caught largely unaware by the changed philosophy as well 
as the new national and international policies.  While policy advocated competition 
and deregulated markets, actual practice was affected by all manner of contrary 
influences.  Reform advocates sought to refashion practice, often without 
appreciations of practice itself or of the full implications of change.  As Brown 
(2003) writes in another setting (considering ecology), 
For every action on a complex, interactive, dynamic system, there are 
unintended consequences.  In general, the unintended consequences are 
recognised later than those that are intended. 
The consequences from Reform actions on the Australian agricultural system and its 
host regions remain little appreciated or acted upon. 
 
 The Road to Reform (see Gruen and Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia 
1978, Chapters 4,5) can be traced back some time.  The decade from the mid 1960’s 
to mid 1970’s was a watershed in Australian agricultural policy direction. Post World 
War II, agricultural policy had been concerned primarily with balance of payments 
stability under a fixed exchange rate system. A complex mix of policy instruments 
was in place to support the contribution of agricultural production to balance of 
payments stability and economic growth. From the mid 1960’s, mining began to 
usurp the importance of agriculture in external balance.  The managed exchange rate 
system became subject to more frequent adjustments. In December 1983, the 
exchange rate system became market determined. 
 
Over the mid 1960’s and early 1970’s agricultural economics began to change focus 
and question resource misallocation of former industry-by-industry support 
programs. Agricultural economists, aware of low farm income problems overseas, 
were beginning to be taken seriously with their warnings of an emerging problem in 
Australia. This led to the publication of the Green Paper Rural Policy in Australia 
(Harris, 1974) as well as the establishment of the Industries Assistance Commission 
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(IAC) following the Crawford Report (1973). The Green Paper, the IAC, the 
emerging influence of agricultural economics and some technical advances were 
pivotal in changing the direction of agricultural policy. 
 
The Green Paper recommended that economic efficiency could be improved by a 
gradual lowering of both the tariff rate and the exchange rate. This was implicitly a 
recommendation to move towards a free trade economy. Two exceptions were 
recognized that could require intervention through subsidization of industries: infant 
industries and terms of trade problems. 
 
General equilibrium modelling of the Australian economy became possible by the 
early work of Evans. His work is accredited with the establishment of the IMPACT 
Project. Evan’s described his model building work as Ricardian1 because one stream 
of theory behind the model was based upon Ricardian trade theory of comparative 
advantage. 
 
The IAC (later the IC) was established under legislation in December 1973 as an 
advisory body to Government. Operational guidelines for the institution 
encompassed: resource allocation, adjustment to change, integration of assistance 
measures with government policy. In 1975, the IAC, along with other major 
Commonwealth Departments, initiated establishment of the IMPACT Project. The 
Project included two general equilibrium economic models (ORANI and 
BUCHUROO) to evaluate a wide range of government policies. By the late 1970’s, 
Impact Project modelling displayed considerable promise for policy evaluation and 
development in the Australian economy. 
 
Agricultural economists had expressed concern over the overseas problem of low 
farm incomes and implications for Australian rural policy. The established closer 
settlement policy direction in Australia was of particular concern. In the early 1970’s, 
policy direction changed from closer settlement to one of rural reconstruction in 
response to structural adjustment problems emerging following changes to overseas 
markets for wool, beef, dairy, wheat and fruit (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and 
Transport References Committee 1994, p 1).  In 1977, rural reconstruction was 
replaced with the concept of rural adjustment to address the environment of constant 
change that pervaded agriculture. 
 
Such were the foundations upon which policy was set.  However the wider world 
changed.  The ratification in 1995 by member countries of the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Agriculture (WTO AoA) introduced, in effect, a 
system of rules based or managed international trade in agriculture. AoA Rules 
addressed five broad policy areas: market access, food security, and domestic 
support, export subsidies and notification of technical support (Muker 2000). The 
rules based system in effect thumbs its nose at the concept of agricultural trade based 
on theoretical free trade. Since 1995 a significant mismatch has existed between 
external environment and domestic position for Australia and its agriculture. 
 
                                                 
1 David Ricardo , (1782-1823) is most remembered for his comparative advantage theory of 
international trade. Comparative advantage underwrites much of the debate on international trade right 
through to the WTO. The significance of a general equilibrium model based on Ricardian principles in 
the 1970’s for Australian economic analysis of policy clearly dates the economic policy of today. 
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Compounding this was the introduction of national Competition Policy Reform Act 
in 1995 (Productivity Commission 1999, Chapter 4).  This institutionalised the 
prevailing microeconomic reform agenda into Australian economic policy.  Three 
intergovernmental agreements underwrite NCP 
• Competition Principles Agreement, CPA, 
• Conduct Code Agreement, CCA, and 
• Agreement to Implement the NCP and Related Reforms. 
 
Under the CCA, all governments agreed to extend competitive conduct rules from 
Part IVA of the Trade Practices Act to all businesses. The CCA has proved disastrous 
for many in rural Australia as conduct was judged not against actual market 
conditions but against the posits of perfect competition.  
 
Further, under the CPA all signatories agreed to review and reform any 
uncompetitive legislation by the year 2000. Orderly marketing arrangements 
operating in the rural sector were then in serious jeopardy.  Few statutory marketing 
authorities remain in Australia today and those that do are under continual threat. 
 
 
2. Orthodox Economics and Agriculture 
 
“criticism of accepted classical theory of economics has consisted not so much in 
finding logical flaws in its analysis as in pointing out that its tacit assumptions 
are seldom or never satisfied, with the result that it cannot solve the problems of 
the real world” Keynes,1936 
 
Contemporary Australian economic policy has become completely dependent upon 
an orthodox economics and some underlying general equilibrium modelling. 
Agricultural policy in particular is a classic example of a policy dependence upon 
theoretical modelling for solutions to dislocations from oversupply in international 
commodity markets. Recent examples of such policy dependence upon economic 
modelling include the structural adjustment solutions for dairy and sugar industry 
deregulation as well as the analysis of effects flowing from Free Trade Agreements 
with the USA and Thailand. 
 
Unfortunately such modelling consistently makes assumptions of market clearance or 
full employment in order to find a solution.  Thus Say’s Law, that supply creates 
demand, returns (Rees and McGovern 1992; Rees 1995).  The emphasis is on supply-
side market economics.  There is heavy reliance upon the particular assumptions 
made.  Fuller discussion of such things must be left to another place.  However, the 
lineage of the thinking can be seen in the short list of comments provided in Table 1.   
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Table 1:  A line of shared thoughts 
 
 
“That there is no harm in prices falling as productivity increases has been pointed 
out again and again e.g. by A. Marshall, N.G.Pierson, W.Lexis, F.Y. 
Edgeworth,F.W. Taussig, L. Mises, A.C. Pigou, D.H. Robertson and G. Habler, (For 
more detailed references see my article on “The Paradox of Saving” , Economica, 
May, 1931,p.161)” (Hayek 1935, p106) 
 
 
 “Deteriorating terms of trade do not necessarily mean that farmer’s average 
incomes will also fall. ----------- Over the longer term, productivity gains, whether 
achieved through improving technical efficiency at the farm level or by taking 
advantage of scale economies are likely to result in average incomes being, at least, 
maintained” (Buckland and Campbell 1980)  
              
            
“The downward trend in real commodity prices need not of itself produce a loss of 
national income nor a decline in the profitability of commodity producers if the 
decline in real commodity or manufactures price is a result of higher 
productivity”(National Farmers Federation 1995, p 7)    
 
 
“Productivity growth continues to be a key determinant of the international 
competitiveness of Australian agriculture and the profitability of particular farm 
industries” (ABARE , p 53)  
 
 
On the sugar industry: 
“ Looking at the worst case scenario, the only way to restore the industry to its 
1996-97 levels of profitability would be for ‘productivity growth in growing 
(excluding CCS), harvesting, transport and milling to increase by 37%  or world 
price to increase by 33%” (CIE 2002, p x) 
 The Report went on to use an underlying assumption in their modelling that would 
deliver on farm productivity gains leading to a 20% increase in cane yields and a 
0.75% increase in CCS . (CIE 2002, p.xi) 
 
The Federal Government commissioned the Hilderbrand Report that had this to say: 
“ These prices will create an urgent need for productivity and cost improvements 
over the medium –longer term in order for the industry to remain internationally 
competitive” (Hilderbrand 2002, p 11)  
 
 
 
 
The necessary structural adjustment solution based upon efficiency and productivity 
improvements is an intellectual legacy from the classical era of economics. This of 
course is entirely consistent with Say’s Law used as the underlying theory of supply 
and demand in current CGE modelling. This legacy from the past has become 
virtually institutionalised in the mindset of Australian agricultural policy.
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Under supply side economics, market dislocation through demand failure cannot 
occur. Demand problems simply do not exist because increased supply creates 
increased demand at an appropriate market-clearing price.  A finesse on this is to 
argue that even if such problems did exist, Australia is a “small nation” and a “price 
taker” and so is unable to influence such things. 
 
If an industry is in trouble, then, it must be supply side structural imperfections that 
are impeding industry efficiency and productivity. So the solution lies in supply side 
structural reform to lift efficiency and productivity.  These are expected to lift to a 
level where industry output clears the market at the prevailing market price. 
Consequent collateral dislocations of industries, farmers, communities and regions 
simply become necessary adjustment costs of restructuring an “inefficient” industry. 
 
Supply side economics is the philosophy underwriting current industry structural 
adjustment policy. There is no recognition of any necessity to constrain supply when 
oversupply dislocates international markets. Policy simply supports the necessary 
level of structural adjustment necessary for markets to clear at the necessary market 
clearing price.  
 
“under certain circumstances, a purely competitive economy will achieve a 
general equilibrium of prices and quantities such that we cannot improve the 
position of any participant in the economy without diminishing someone 
else’s satisfaction. Under these circumstances, we say that the purely 
competitive economy has achieved an efficient allocation of resources”             
(Gill 1973, p 507) 
 
It is the “certain circumstances” that are of interest.  Market structure under CGE 
modelling is assumed to be one of pure competition. In textbooks, the term pure is 
often substituted for perfect competition (Davidson and Stewardson 1978, p 270-1). 
Market characteristics that must exist for a market to be purely or perfectly 
competitive include (Koutsoyiannis 1975, pp 154-5): 
• There must be a large number of buyers and sellers so that no market 
participant can influence price or quantity 
• A homogeneous product is produced 
• No barrier to entry or exit either to or from the industry 
• Profit maximization is the goal of all market participants 
• No government involvement in the industry  
• Perfect mobility of factors of production 
• Perfect knowledge so that all sellers and buyers have complete knowledge of 
market conditions 
 
 It is only under such a market structure that competitive efficiency can be achieved 
(Gill 1973, pp 510-511). A key question to be addressed is: “To what extent does real 
world agriculture comply with the structural requirements of pure competition?”     
 
To consider just one condition, the fifth, there is considerable government 
intervention in agriculture in many OECD countries, as is evident from Figure 1. 
Support to agriculture varies widely from country to country with Australia the 
second lowest to New Zealand across the OECD. It is not difficult to conclude that 
the underlying assumptions required of a purely competitive market structure are not 
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reflected in the real world of agricultural international trade. Of particular interest are 
the imperfections of international markets faced by Australia’s major export 
industries of sugar, dairy, wheat, beef/veal.  Such market “imperfections” can be 
further compounded by the distribution of, and any controls on, market power by 
parties along the supply chain. 
 
Figure 1.  Producer support levels for various countries and commodities 
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% PSE by Commodity 2000-2002
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Note.  The % PSE is total support provided to farmers expressed as a percentage of gross farm 
receipts at farm gate value. It is the most widely accepted measure for comparisons of farmer support 
levels across countries industries and time (OECD 2000, p 39) 
 
Sources: Compiled from Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries Monitoring and Evaluation 2003, 
Table Annex 2, PSE by Country pp. 44-45 and Annex Table 3 , PSE by Commodity, pp 46-47  
 
There is a clear divergence between agricultural market structures and the underlying 
requirements of a purely competitive market. Policy based upon the strict 
assumptions underlying pure competition is inappropriate in the real world of 
agricultural trade. Policy responsibilities for Australian rural industries long term 
declining terms of trade are not insignificant.  
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Between 1960-61 and 2000-01, agricultural industry terms of trade for the farm 
sector fell from an index value of 222.9 to 99.6 (Australian Bureau of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics ABARE 2002, p 17).  This represents an annualised 
average decline of around 2%.  A break down the component parts of the terms of 
trade demonstrates the significance of terms of trade decline as an important factor 
influencing decision-making at farm level. Over the forty-year period, the prices 
received index increased at the annual rate of 3.6 % whilst prices paid rose by 5.8%. 
Meanwhile, inflation in the wider economy, measured by the CPI, rose on an annual 
basis by 5.8%.  
 
Real output rose by 2.7% pa over the period 1960-61 to 2000-01 (as calculated from 
GVFP data and Prices Received Index). However, despite rising real output, the 
index of value of real net farm production fell from 199 to 139 representing an 
annual average rate decline of 0.9% in real NVFP.  It can be inferred from analysis of 
real NVFP decline that real farm incomes also declined.   
 
Such analysis as well as of correlations suggests that costs drive production.  Thus 
farmers, who essentially produce in the short run, seek to continually cover costs.  As 
standard short run analysis suggests, they will continue to do this as long as returns 
are expected to cover variable costs.  They may then allocate any remainder towards 
meeting fixed costs (such as repayments on capital, be it financial, human or natural). 
 
How might such variations in returns and costs be explained?  A mal-distribution of 
market power provides one theoretical explanation of price movement differentials 
between farm input markets and output markets. Market power of input suppliers 
across the wider economy has been adequate for them to maintain their output price 
movements consistent with CPI changes. Conversely, the fact that the farm sector 
could not hold input prices equal to agricultural output price movements confirms 
they have minimal market power in the commodity production process. 
  
However, an absence of market power does not in itself adequately explain the 
inability of farmers to maintain commodity real prices. Standard textbook theory of 
supply and demand would explain the problem as one of persistent oversupply of 
commodities relative to demand. Persistent oversupply is in itself evidence of an 
inefficient allocation of resources somewhere. Clearly, supply has not been creating 
demand as might have been assumed by some considering agricultural markets.  
    
The long-term decline in real net value of production carries implications for farm 
sector growth and stability. It suggests that expanding production has not been 
adequate to fund sectoral growth. Credit had to fill the gap. Over the long term, 
increasing farm sector fragility would be expected to become a feature of particular 
rural industries heavily dependent upon credit financed expansion to supply volatile 
international commodity markets. 
 
As indicated, policy response to industry dislocation from oversupplied markets has 
been to immediately call for a modelled industry solution. However because demand 
is determined by appropriately priced supply in CGE modelling, it comes as no 
surprise that supply side structural reform is the modelled solution. A standard 
structural adjustment package is provided to implement the necessary structural 
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reforms so that the industry can meet the prevailing market clearing price.  While 
there may have once been hope (back in the 1970s) that the actual conditions of trade 
might move towards the ideal, the signing of the WTO AoA in 1995 and now the 
USA-Australia Free Trade Agreement (USAA FTA) signal acceptance of the 
opposite.  Structured trade regimes exist and can operate acceptably under 
promulgated rules.  Australia now explicitly recognises the ongoing existence of non 
market factors, such as various USA farm supports.  Agriculture is caught between.     
 
Dislocations at community and regional level follow with associated investment and 
human costs.  Such things are rationalized away as necessary adjustment costs, things 
needed for required efficiency and productivity improvements. Forced revisits to 
packages for pork, sugar and dairy are not recognized as reflecting inappropriate 
policy.  They are deemed industry reluctance to embrace change rather than problems 
with the proposals per se.  Blame shifting is not policy analysis, however.  
 
Improved management techniques, application of technology, reconfiguration of 
farm resource use, factor transfer, factor expansion, and farm build up are the 
suggested ways of improving farm efficiency and productivity. Over time as 
technology is applied to farm production systems, factor proportions change so that 
an industry becomes less labour dependent and more capital intensive. At farm level, 
this requires credit funding and adds to debt imposts for individual farmers and the 
industry as a whole. The responsibility of efficiency and productivity emphasis in 
Australian agricultural policy has been significant in the rising debt levels of the 
sector as farmers have desperately sought to comply with industry policy direction. 
 
3. Differing constructs and interpretations  
 
Of efficiency 
 
Ideas and constructs such as efficiency can be variously interpreted and used.  
Efficiency in its technical sense can be misapplied in its wider usage.  Thus in 
agricultural economics, the Paretian concept of efficiency is accepted despite the 
strict value judgments (Gruen and Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia 1978, 
pp 197-8). Paretian efficiency is also competitive efficiency in economic textbooks 
(Gill 1973, pp 507-510). This theoretical definition of efficiency is a textbook 
teaching “benchmark” for policy analysis.  
 
Such “efficiency” does not exist in the real world because of very restrictive 
underlying assumptions of pure competition. The real world of agricultural markets 
is one of substantial government intervention, unequal distribution of market power, 
intense regulation, immobility of factors of production, and very imperfect 
knowledge. To use “efficiency” as the solution to debilitated agricultural export 
industries becomes an exercise in politics rather than economics.  It exploits an idea 
and misapplies it. 
 
The apparent understanding of competitive efficiency used by most Australian 
politicians, academic advisors, bureaucrats, and media commentators is the ability of 
an agricultural industry to meet some international or border price of a particular 
commodity. Border price comparisons show Australian farmers are very competitive.
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       Table 2.  Agricultural Support: Selected Comparisons 2000/2002 
 
Country NZ     Australia EU US Canada         OECD 
 
 %PSE  1%    4%  35% 21%     19%             31% 
 NPCp  1.01    1  1.33 1.13      1.12 1.32 
NPCc  1.1    1  1.4 1.11       1.16 1.37 
 
Notes: 
% Producer Support Estimate (%PSE) measures total farm support as a % of total farm revenue at 
farm gate value 
Nominal Protection Coefficient for Producers (NPCp) is the ratio of the average price received by 
producers at farm gate to border prices measured at farm gate value 
Nominal Protection Coefficient for consumers (NPCc) is the ratio between the average price paid by 
consumers at farm gate to border price measured at farm gate value 
Source. Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries Monitoring and Evaluation, Highlights, 2003; 
Annex Table 2; Annex Table 6  (OECD 2002) 
 
By OECD standards, Australia is second only to New Zealand in terms minimal farm 
support measured as  %PSE. The common efficiency measure of Australian farmers 
is confirmed by the NPCp value of 1. At this value, the average farm gate price 
received for commodities is equal to the international price border price. With an 
NPCc of 1, Australian consumers have the cheapest food inputs across the OECD. 
 
Australian farmers are border price/ internationally competitive.  However, they are 
not “competitively” efficient. This confused understanding of efficiency has 
important implications for rural policy and sectoral stability. It lies at the heart of the 
inappropriate structural adjustment solutions of current Australian agricultural policy. 
 
Of agricultural production 
 
Conflict between urban lifestyle values and the farm sector can be directly attributed 
to rural policy reliance upon CGE modelling. Urban lifestyle policy solutions require 
government intervention to alleviate perceived externalities from the agricultural 
production process. Purely competitive price determination under CGE modelling is 
a market clearance competitive efficiency outcome. There is no role for government 
intervention under the principles of competitive efficiency.  
 
The appropriate market-clearing price, in a purely competitive market structure, is 
determined when marginal costs of inputs equal the marginal value of output. Inputs 
are restricted to those required in the actual physical production process. Input costs 
therefore do not recognise unintended outcomes of the production process that are 
costs to the overall welfare of society in terms of environmental and conservation 
impacts and resource depletion. This is why agricultural policy and environmental 
policy in Australia are in open conflict. 
 
The theoretical way around this policy dilemma is the Kaldor-Hicks compensation 
solution whereby gainers compensate losers. Real world outcomes of the applied 
compensation principle appear to be that gainers gain and losers lose. Real world 
outcomes expressed physically in terms of unemployed/ underemployed factors of 
production, rising levels of poverty, falling living standards, and consequent 
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breakdown in the fabric of society are tell-tale signs of emerging conflict between 
theoretical and real world outcomes. They are also physical evidence of an inefficient 
allocation of resources for the economy as a whole. 
 
4. A Suggested Way Forward  
 
There clearly is a case for leaders from both environmental movements and rural 
agro-politics to take advice from a wider range of economic philosophy and theory 
than the current economic orthodoxy. Both sides have much at stake; but then, so 
does the economic welfare of society.  Domestic thinking needs renewal. 
 
International thinking also needs renewal, if only because of Australia and other 
WTO members ratifying the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. A rules based system 
exists, yet it is not recognised by those advocating current policy directions in 
Australia.  How long can the now established, legal international framework for 
international agricultural trade be ignored by such (clearly myopic) “thinkers”?  How 
long will they, and we, hide behind expressed fears of “retaliation” were Australia to 
act within the rules to advance its national interest? The US Farm Bill is WTO AoA 
compatible.   
 
The WTO system has become also the model under which member countries engage 
in bilateral trade agreements, of which NAFTA and the USA-Australia agreement are 
examples.  Indeed the signing of the USA A FTA makes it increasingly important for 
Australian policy leaders to embrace WTO AoA Rules.  The increase in farm support 
in Mexico (OECD 2002, Annex Table 2, p 44) from 0% in 1986-88 to 22% by 2002-
03 indicates the importance of such measures under a FTA, as do ongoing CAP 
measures within the EU.  An important point is that NAFTA member nations may 
enjoy access via the US to Australia.  Australia’s 5% PSE in 2002 sees its industries 
dangerously unsupported when compared to the 18%, 20% and 22% PSE levels in 
the NAFTA parties of USA, Canada and Mexico respectively (OECD 2002, op cit). 
 
Under WTO AoA regulations (WTO , pp 43-71, and as detailed in Table 2), 
Australia’s domestic support to agriculture could be considerably upgraded. Other 
advanced agricultural producing countries more imaginatively structure farm support 
programs to meet a wide diversity of policy objectives ranging across farm income 
support, food nutritional programs, conservation and environmental policy, and 
regional development. 
 
There are clearly defined grounds upon which domestic support can be provided. 
Each member nation has an agreed upon “Aggregate Measure of Support” (AMS). 
The AMS refers to the annual level of monetary support provided to producers of an 
agricultural product. A defined base period and given formula is used to calculate 
support at point of first sale. All budgetary outlays of governments as either taxation 
relief or actual expenditure are included.  
 
A system of exclusions and exemptions is provided under which a member nation 
can deliver support in addition to their defined AMS. Australian agriculture will need 
to embrace the system of exemptions to structure a modern agricultural policy for the 
twenty first century rules-based environment.  
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Table 2:  Some of the possibilities under the WTO AoA  
Exclusions 
AMS calculation excludes support to domestic producers under prescribed circumstances.  
De Minimus Percentage. Designated product specific or product non-specific support that does not 
exceed 5% of the value of production is excluded.  
Supply Constraint. Direct payments to producers under prescribed production constraints are excluded 
provided: Payments are based upon predetermined area and yields; Payments are 85% or less of the 
base production level; Livestock payments based upon a fixed number of head. 
 
Exemptions 
Certain expenditures on farm support programs can be exempt from AMS reduction calculation. Such 
expenditure must have little or no trade distorting effects upon production. Programs can be funded 
through either public expenditure or taxation concessions; but cannot provide price support to 
producers.  
Government general service programs are considered exempt e.g.: research, pest and disease control, 
training, inspection services, marketing and promotion. and infrastructure. Considerable opportunities 
exist across government general services, nutritional food programs, income support, environmental 
objectives, structural adjustment, rural development, and retirement programs. An untapped public 
policy area in Australia is nutritional food aid to underprivileged groups. Eligibility for benefits must 
be clearly defined in terms of nutritional objectives.  
 
Income Support: Direct Payments 
Direct payments to producers for income support are allowable; but must not have the effect of price 
support. Programs can be designed around the following policy instruments: decoupled income 
support, income insurance, natural disasters, structural adjustment, environmental programs, and 
regional assistance. 
 
Decoupled income programs must be based upon income, producer or landowner status, and factor use 
or production level over a defined fixed base period. Payments cannot recognize price or production 
information post the selected base period. Payments can be made under circumstance of nil 
production. 
 
Income insurance benefits and income safety net payments can be designed provided payments are 
based upon income loss from agricultural activities. Income loss must exceed 30% averaged over the 
preceding three years. A variation of this formula is a three year average from the preceding five years 
income. Payments must be less than 70% of eligible income and not related to production or price.  
 
Natural Disaster payments can be structured as income support. There must be a formal recognition 
by government that a defined natural disaster is in progress. An income loss of 30% over a three-year 
defined period is required. Payments are restricted to income loss, livestock losses, and land 
degradation due to the defined natural disaster.  
 
Structural adjustment benefits can include retirement programs for aged farmers and those exiting 
marketable agricultural production. Resource retirement programs are also an option. Resource 
retirement programs must be for a minimum period of three years comprising retirement of land or 
livestock from marketable agricultural production. Payments ignore remaining farm resource use and 
prevailing commodity prices. Within certain prescribed parameters, structural adjustment can be 
provided also in the form of investment aids to physically restructure a farm operation experiencing 
structural disadvantage 
 
Environmental programs based upon direct payments must be part of defined government 
environmental or conservation policy objectives. Specific program requirements are required to be 
met by recipients and can encompass production methods or input use. Payments must relate to 
income loss or increased costs from compliance with government environmental programs.  
 
Regional Assistance Programs payments can be made to producers in disadvantaged regions. A region 
must be defined geographically with a recognized economic and administrative identity. The regional 
disadvantage must be defined in law or regulation; and, not be of a temporary nature. Payments can 
not recognize type or volume of production post the defined base year unless that production pattern is 
to be reduced. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
As Australia enters the twenty first century, agricultural policy is still firmly 
anchored to the protectionist debate from the third quarter of last century and the 
economic orthodoxy that swept the western world from the mid 1970’s. This was a 
neoclassical synthesis underwritten by general equilibrium theory.  
 
Technological advances in the early 1970’s made possible the development of 
computerized general equilibrium modelling of the Australian economy. This 
modelling has been seen as an essential tool of industry and policy analysis since, 
with pervasive effects on economic thinking in Australia. For agriculture, economic 
modelling of solutions to industry dislocation has become almost ritualistic. 
Politicians and industry leaders deliver “enlightened” modelled solutions of 
necessary structural adjustment to troubled industries.  
 
The tragedy for agriculture is that underlying economic modelling are very restrictive 
assumptions that do not reflect the real world. Consequently, the 1936 criticisms of 
Keynes remain valid because neither the underlying assumptions of CGE nor the 
modelled outcomes reflect the realities faced by agriculture and Australia. Modelled 
solutions to real world agricultural policy problems are not possible. Strict adherence 
to modelled structural adjustment solutions in agricultural policy become more an 
exercise in social engineering than appropriate policy formulation or tenable problem 
resolution.  
 
Competitive efficiency of agricultural industries has been the mantra of politicians 
and agro politicians justifying their commitment to structural reform of rural 
industries. Competitive efficiency though has a particular meaning in general 
equilibrium theory.  It is not clear that those who mouth the mantra understand the 
implications for real world policy.  
 
For competitive efficiency to prevail all markets have to clear simultaneously at 
market clearing prices such that marginal input costs equal marginal output price. 
Unintended costs of the production system on the wider society such as 
environmental, conservation and resource sustainability are not part of competitive 
efficiency costing. Failure of environmental and agro political leaders to understand 
this feature of agricultural policy means that urban and rural Australia are now in 
open conflict. There is a real need for leaders of both groups to understand the nature 
of the problem and pursue a mutual political solution 
 
WTO member nations ratified the Agreement on Agriculture in 1995. For almost a 
decade, mature agricultural countries overseas have used WTO AoA Rules to 
structure compliant domestic agricultural support using AMSs to their fullest and to 
employ the system of exempt payments to maximise domestic agricultural support. 
Australia stubbornly resists this change and clings to the policies of yesterday. 
 
Now that Australia has negotiated an FTA with the US, the “vintage policy” of 
structural adjustment and its relevance must come under increasing pressure. The 
Mexican and Canadian experiences should not be ignored.  Nor should arrangements 
deemed necessary for cohesion, social or otherwise, in other FTAs.  
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WTO AoA exempt policy instruments can accommodate the environmental 
movement demands for lifestyle policies in Australia. Policy instruments can be 
structured so that they can form income flows and compensation to affected rural 
producers. This will deliver, in part, some much needed redistribution of income 
back to rural Australians.  
 
In the end Australia and Australians must provide answers to these questions: 
• How long can Australia continue to redistribute income away from rural 
Australia to urban Australia? 
• What are the political ramifications of continuing down this path?  
• How do you deliver a just price for agricultural output in a modern society 
given the lack of market power in the farm sector? 
• How does a modern society resolve the conflict between urban lifestyle issues 
and rural policy predicated upon irrelevant theoretical constructs?  
• How much longer can Australia continue to ignore the WTO AoA and a 
rules-based system of international trade in agriculture? 
• What are the ramifications for rural Australia if agricultural policy remains 
entrenched in the debate from the third quarter of last century? 
Answering such important questions deserves priority, and not just in regional or 
rural circles but also in the national dialogue. 
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